Ssh-2.0-cisco-1.25 Vulnerability Official

If encryption is weakened, attackers might be able to hijack administrative sessions.

When an SSH client initiates a secure connection to a remote server over TCP Port 22, the server responds with an identification string. This string lets the client know what capabilities are supported. For many enterprise-grade Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and NX-OS implementations, that string takes the specific signature form: SSH-2.0-Cisco-1.25

While it operates within Cisco’s monolithic environments like , certain lines of production equipment tie this module closely to underlying application stacks, including embedded Erlang/OTP SSH server implementations used to process high-throughput telecommunication messages. Key Vulnerabilities Tied to Cisco SSH Deployments ssh-2.0-cisco-1.25 vulnerability

! Disable SSHv1 entirely no ip ssh version 1 ip ssh version 2

Internal flaws inside the Cisco-1.25 software state machine expose core enterprise routing switches to memory corruption and unexpected crashes. If encryption is weakened, attackers might be able

The identifier is not a specific vulnerability itself, but rather the exact text string an enterprise router or switch transmits during an initial SSH handshake. Network security scanners flag this string to identify the underlying operating system and cross-reference it with known Secure Shell flaws found in legacy Cisco IOS and IOS XE software .

Many systems under this banner are rooted in foundational programming stacks. For example, a vast subset of Cisco products utilizes an embedded Erlang/OTP framework to run their underlying multi-threaded routing and management daemons smoothly. Primary Vulnerabilities Tied to the "Cisco-1.25" Profile For many enterprise-grade Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and

Over the years, several other vulnerabilities have been discovered in Cisco’s SSH implementation, many of which would likely present the same banner. These range from simple DoS attacks to severe authentication bypasses.

: By carefully removing or truncating data sequence numbers during the packet exchange, the attacker fools the system into lowering its security posture.

| Attack | Likelihood | Impact | |--------|-------------|--------| | DoS (crafted packet) | Medium | Device reload | | Weak cipher forced | Low (requires MitM) | Session decryption | | RCE | Very low (unproven for 1.25) | Critical |